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Abstract We consider supplier-credit contracting between a manufacturer and a
liquidity-constrained dealer. We show that the timeliness according to which the dealer
receives demand information has a significant impact on the optimal contract. If the
manufacturer cannot be sure that a dealer without liquidity has demand information
when the contract is written, the optimal contract assigns the same quantity to an
ignorant dealer and a dealer who knows that there are unfavorable demand conditions.
However, dealers with favorable demand information are screened. If the dealer’s
liquidity rises, the manufacturer proposes a contract that resembles the solution of a
classic adverse selection model in the spirit of Harris et al. (Manag Sci 28:604–620,
1982). For high liquidity, the optimal supplier-credit contract assigns the same quan-
tity to an ignorant dealer and dealers who have favorable demand information whereas
dealers with unfavorable demand information are screened.
Keywords Supply-chain contract · Supplier credit · Limited liquidity ·
Timeliness of information
1 Introduction
Financial management of the supply chain is not an invention of the financial cri-
sis. However, the breakdown of the credit markets puts large members of the supply
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chain into a permanent responsibility for small and medium-sized firms. As a recent
publication by Deloitte puts it:1
“[…] even after the current crisis subsides, credit is likely to remain much tighter
than in recent years, which means there will be more and more cases where sup-
ply chain financing isn’t just helpful—it’s essential”.
This paper studies a manufacturer who must design a supply-chain contract with a
liquidity-constrained dealer. The manufacturer’s task is to determine the conditions of
a supplier credit. Our research interest is to find conditions under which a dealer’s lim-
ited liquidity has a significant influence on the shape of the optimal contract, especially
on the emergence of quantity assignments that do not respond to the dealer’s infor-
mation about demand. We identify the timeliness of the dealer’s access to information
about demand as a key driver.
In our model, a liquidity-constrained dealer knows whether he has been able to
timely update his knowledge about demand in the upcoming period before contract-
ing with a manufacturer. The manufacturer faces the problem that she does not know
whether she faces an informed dealer and, if informed, what the information is. Our
analysis starts with benchmark cases where each of the dealer’s protections at the
contracting stage, limited liquidity and private demand information, is studied inde-
pendently.
Limited liquidity has already been studied by Sappington (1983). Sappington shows
that the optimal contract under limited liquidity2 is very similar to one where there is
precontractual asymmetric information (as, e.g., in Harris et al. 1982). We supplement
his results by showing that effects of limited liquidity cannot be studied convinc-
ingly in a scenario where the dealer has timely demand information at the contracting
stage for sure.3 Therefore, we consider a scenario where the manufacturer is uncertain
whether the dealer has timely demand information or whether the dealer is ignorant
at the contracting stage.
Such potential ignorance at the contracting stage has been studied in a previous
paper by Lewis and Sappington (1993); LS hereafter. LS assume that the dealer may
or may not be ignorant at the contracting stage, but has no liquidity constraints. They
show that the manufacturer assigns the same quantity to an informed dealer with
favorable information and to an ignorant dealer.
We then consider the case where the dealer faces a liquidity constraint right from the
outset. Our results are most nicely illustrated in the case where the inverse hazard rate
of the demand parameter is linear. In the extreme case where the dealer has absolutely
no liquidity at the outset, the optimal supply-credit contract bunches together an igno-
rant dealer and informed dealers who have received unfavorable information. At the
1 See Deloitte Consulting (2008): “Breathing room—Ten ideas for squeezing more working capital from
your supply chain”.
2 Sappington (1983) calls his assumption “limited liability”. If the dealer is informed for sure, limited
liability and limited liquidity lead to identical results in our model.
3 More recently, a number of papers has extended the problem to situations where the amount of the dealer’s
liquidity is also unknown (Che and Gale 2000; Lewis and Sappington 2000, 2001).
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same time, informed dealers with favorable information are screened. We then look at
the optimal supply-credit contract if the dealer’s liquidity gradually improves. Then,
the amount of bunching is reduced. For some intermediate amount of liquidity, we
obtain screening for all possible types of dealers. In this case, the form of the optimal
supplier-credit contract exactly replicates the solution to the classic adverse selection
model in the spirit of Harris et al. (1982). For even higher liquidity, an ignorant dealer
receives the same quantity assignment as an informed dealer who knows that he has
favorable information, just as in the LS model.
Our major results center around the emergence of bunching if there are liquidity
constraints and/or ignorance. Therefore, we also look at the robustness of our results.
We show that the curvature of the inverse hazard rate, hence the manufacturer’s incen-
tive cost, is crucial for bunching and screening patterns. For instance, the above result
where there is full screening in the case of intermediate liquidity extends to the case
where the inverse hazard rate is convex. However, if the inverse hazard rate is concave,
full screening becomes impossible.
Our view on the problem also offers an extension to accounting research by Dye
(1985), Jung and Kwon (1988) and Penno (1997). In these papers, the financial
market does not know whether or not the manager possesses information. These
papers make the point that the ‘disclosure principle’ (existence of a full screen-
ing equilibrium) might fail due to the presence of potentially ignorant managers.
Instead, there will be partial pooling where good types disclose and bad types do not
communicate their knowledge. The difference to our problem is that we look at con-
tractually required reports to a creditor instead of voluntary reporting to the equity
market.
The further organization of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the
model and develops the manufacturer’s optimization problem. Section 3 then presents
the solution in three steps. First, we look at the three benchmark settings where (i)
the dealer has timely demand information for sure but no liquidity, (ii) the dealer
has high liquidity but does not have timely information, and (iii) where the dealer
has high liquidity but it is unknown whether or not he has timely information. After-
wards we derive the general solution. Some final discussions are in the concluding
Sect. 4.
2 The model
There are two firms, a manufacturer (firm 1; she) and a dealer (firm 2; he). The lat-
ter sells the product on the downstream market, thus earning a revenue R(q, θ) =
θq + r(q) where q denotes the number of units sold and θ is the realization of a
random variable. High values of θ indicate good information. For all θ , we assume
that R(0, θ) = 0 and R(q, θ) is concave in q and increasing at q = 0. This additive
form is a simple representation of revenues in an imperfect downstream market. It
includes the familiar linear demand case where R(q, θ) = θq − bq2, b > 0.
Prior to the contracting stage, firms share common beliefs over the distribution
function F(θ) with positive density f (θ) > 0 over an interval [θ, θ ] with θ > 0.
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Fig. 1 Time line
We denote the expected value of θ by E{θ} and assume that F(θ) satisfies a standard
regularity condition.4
Assumption 1 The functions
θ → F(θ)f (θ) and θ → −
1 − F(θ)
f (θ) (1)
are increasing in θ .
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events. We assume that with probability p, the
dealer receives timely demand information at date 0. In this case, he learns the demand
parameter θ before the supply-chain contract is written. With probability (1 − p), the
dealer receives no such information before the contracting stage and learns θ only ex
post at date 3. In this case, we call the dealer ignorant at the contracting stage. For-
mally, we assume that the dealer obtains a signal s that, with probability p, conveys
precise information s = θ . With probability (1 − p), the dealer receives an entirely
uninformative signal s = s0 and learns nothing. The manufacturer has no access to
any information gathering technology. At any time, the value of the demand parameter
θ remains unverifiable to third parties, that is, θ is even uncontractible ex post. We
assume that p is common knowledge.
To produce q, the manufacturer incurs production costs C(q) with C(0) = C ′(0) =
0, C ′(q > 0) > 0, and C ′′(q) ≥ 0.
At the outset, the dealer has limited funds that determine his liquidity. Denote these
initial liquid funds by K . If K is low, the dealer may not be able to pay the manufacturer
at the time of delivery. Then, the manufacturer must act as a creditor. The supplier
credit can only be refunded after q has been sold on the downstream market. To avoid
further complexity, we assume that the dealer always fully sells the available quantity
and that no retention of title clause is feasible, for instance, because the country’s
jurisdiction does not support such clauses.5
4 Usually, only the second of the above properties is assumed. This is because in a standard hidden-type
agency model, incentive constraints are binding towards bad types (“downward binding”). In our setting,
also “upward” binding incentive constraints may occur. Thus, we need both regularity conditions.
5 Retention of title clauses are particularly prevalent in the Germanic countries. In other European countries
and in North America they appear to be less common. There may be a variety of reasons for this, most
importantly seems to be the separation of contract right and property right (Abstraktionsprinzip) in the
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The supply-chain contract specifies some amount t that must be refunded at the end
of the period. The manufacturer’s and the dealer’s profits, 1 and 2, then read as
1 = t − C(q) and 2 = θq + r(q) − t.
At date 1, the manufacturer suggests a supply credit contract to the dealer. We
denote a supply credit contract by [q(·), t (·)] where q(·) is a quantity assignment
and t (·) is the dealer’s payment obligation. Without loss of generality, we can invoke
the revelation principle and concentrate on direct truth-telling mechanisms (Myerson
1982). That is, the manufacturer asks the dealer to report the information s at date 2.
For each possible report m ∈ {s0}∪[ θ, θ ], the manufacturer designs a specific quantity
assignment q(m) and an according payment obligation t (m). In a revelation contract,
the dealer reports truthfully, i.e., m = s for all s ∈ {s0} ∪ [ θ, θ ]. Put otherwise, the
dealer with information s must prefer a supply credit contract [q(s), t (s)] to any other
contract [q(s′), t (s′)] in the menu of contracts that has been specified by the manu-
facturer at date 1. To shorten notation, we define the contract that is designed for an
ignorant dealer as [q0, t0] ≡ [q(s0), t (s0)].
The manufacturer faces two difficulties at date 1. First, the menu of supply-credit
contract proposals must reflect the fact that the dealer is possibly ignorant about θ . Sec-
ond, the payment obligation t must never exceed the dealer’s total verifiable liquidity
at date 3 when q has been sold on the downstream market.
The second of the manufacturer’s difficulties deserves a deeper discussion. As
emphasized, e.g. by Cachon (2003) and Cachon and Lariviere (2001), the set of feasi-
ble payment obligations t (m) crucially depends on the compliance regime. Sanctions
must prevent that after having signed some contract (q(m), t (m)), the dealer declares
himself unable to pay t (m). More concretely, contract enforcement depends on the
interplay of civil law and criminal law. With unlimited verifiable liquidity, ex-post
moral hazard can easily be avoided by specifying prohibitive contractual sanctions;
hence the rules of criminal law are irrelevant for ensuring that the dealer fulfills his
payment obligation. However, with limited liquidity, contractual sanctions are limited
to the amount of verifiably available liquid funds. These funds are given by the mini-
mum possible revenue, R(q(m), θ) = θq(m)+r(q(m)), plus the dealer’s initial liquid
funds K . We assume that the dealer can secretly consume any revenue that is earned
in excess. It follows that limited liquidity seriously affects the set of feasible contracts.
If it cannot be verified that the dealer’s liquid funds at date 3 exceed R(q(m), θ)+ K ,
any initial payment obligation t (m = s0) that exceeds R(q(m), θ) + K cannot be
enforced.
Enforceability of contracts is also supported by criminal law, though. Suppose for
instance that, at date 2, a dealer declares to know that market conditions are extremely
good, i.e., m = θ . At the time of payment (date 3), he declares himself unable to pay.
The dealer may, for instance, pretend that his initial announcement was false and the
true realization was θ . In such a case, he admits fraud (m = s) and sanctions according
Footnote 5 continued
Germanic countries. In most other countries, retention of title clauses expire when the retailer sells the good
to a third party or are not even feasible in the first place.
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to criminal law will be imposed. We assume that punishments are prohibitively harsh
such that it is never rational for the dealer to declare m = s ex post.6
Assumption 2 Criminal law classifies the dealer’s reporting behavior as fraud if and
only if the dealer must admit that m = s. Fraud is punished such that the dealer’s
perceived disadvantage from the sanction is prohibitively high.
Under Assumption 2, a report of m = s0 will never be classified as fraud because
the dealer has admitted that he is ignorant. Given that there is common knowledge
about K and the probability p, the manufacturer designs the supply-credit contract.
She aims at maximizing her own expected profit,
max{
q(s), t (s)
s ∈ {s0} ∪ [θ, θ ]
} E{1}= p
θ∫
θ
[t (θ) − C(q(θ))] f (θ)dθ
+(1 − p)
[
t0 − C(q0)
]
, (2)
subject to a set of constraints that we introduce below.
Given an actual demand parameter θ , define the dealer’s profit after having reported
m by 2(m | θ). There are two kinds of participation constraints. An informed dealer
will accept the contract only if he receives a non-negative profit under truth telling,
2(θ | θ) = θq(θ) + r(q(θ)) − t (θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ ]. (3)
Similarly, an ignorant dealer will participate if he expects non-negative profits,
Eθ {2(s0|θ)} = E{θ}q0 + r(q0) − t0 ≥ 0. (4)
Since the informed dealer is protected by constraint (3), limited liquidity has bite if
the manufacturer faces the ignorant dealer. The latter’s ex-post profits may turn out to
be negative. Therefore, it must hold
2(s
0|θ) = θq0 + r(q0) − t0 ≥ −K ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ ]
which is implied by
2(s
0|θ) = θq0 + r(q0) − t0 ≥ −K . (5)
6 Notice that if the dealer has limited liquid funds, these sanctions must be of non-monetary nature (e.g.
imprisonment). The manufacturer cannot replicate such punishments through a contract. The basic message
of our model carries over to a model with ex post uncertainty with R(q, θ) = θq +r(q)+ if the variance of
the ex post noise  is sufficiently small, such that, in the presence of extreme deviations of E{R(q(m), m)}
from (verifiable) ex post revenue, a court will judge that fraud has taken place “beyond a reasonable doubt”.
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Notice that with Assumption 2, it is not optimal to specify any payment obligation
higher than t0 = θq0 + r(q0) + K because the dealer will always be able to claim
that the true state of nature was θ .
Now consider the incentive constraints. First, the informed dealer should report
truthfully, that is,
2(θ |θ) ≥ 2(m|θ) ∀(θ, m) ∈ [θ, θ ]2. (6)
Moreover, the informed dealer should not claim to be ignorant,
2(θ |θ) ≥ 2(s0|θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ ]. (7)
Finally, an ignorant dealer should not claim to be informed,
Eθ
{
2(s
0|θ)
}
≥ Eθ {2(m|θ)} ∀m ∈ [θ, θ ]. (8)
In the following we will make extensive use of the result that the informed dealer’s
incentive constraint (6) is satisfied if and only if the quantity assignment q(θ) is non-
decreasing in θ . We call this the monotonicity constraint (see Guesnerie and Laffont
1984, or Theorem 7.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
3 Optimal supply credit contracts
3.1 Three benchmark cases
Before we come to the solution to the manufacturer’s general problem we sketch the
solutions of three benchmark cases. In the first, the probability p of facing an informed
dealer equals one. In the second, we assume that the dealer is ignorant for sure but has
unlimited liquidity. In the third, liquidity is again unlimited, but the probability p of
having an informed dealer is strictly between zero and one. In all these cases, contract
enforcement and compliance play no active role.
First, consider the case of p=1. In this case the constraints (4), (7), and (8) are irrel-
evant and we are back to the standard situation of the literature (e.g. Harris et al. 1982).
The solution to the problem is well known. Denote the optimal quantity assignment
rule by q p=1(θ).
Lemma 1 Suppose that p = 1. For all K ≥ 0 the optimal quantity assignment rule
q p=1(θ) maximizes
θ∫
θ
[
θq(θ) + r(q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) − q(θ)1 − F(θ)f (θ)
]
f (θ)dθ (9)
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and is given by
θ + r ′(q p=1(θ)) − C ′(q p=1(θ)) − 1 − F(θ)f (θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ ]. (10)
Proof See Appendix.
The manufacturer’s objective function (9) equals the expected total supply chain
profit, E{R(q(θ), θ)− C(q(θ))} minus expected incentive costs, E{q(θ)(1 − F(θ))/
f (θ)}. These incentive costs arise because the dealer can protect himself against full
extraction of earned revenue by claiming that demand is low. Hence, a dealer in a
favorable market will only reveal the true realization of θ if he is compensated for the
foregone benefit of cheating.
The quantity assignment rule q p=1(θ) is chosen such that, for every θ, marginal
revenue θ + r ′(q(θ)) equals marginal virtual cost, C ′(q(θ)) + (1 − F(θ))/ f (θ). In
what follows, the global shape of the marginal incentive cost (1 − F(θ))/ f (θ) will
play a crucial role for the characterization of our main results.
As a further characteristic of q p=1(θ), no efficiency distortion arises if the demand
parameter takes it most favorable realization, i.e., q p=1(θ) = qFB(θ) where qFB(θ)
denotes the First-Best quantity assignment, i.e., it solves θ+r ′(qFB(θ)) = C ′(qFB(θ)).
Last, limited liquidity plays no active role in the standard scenario, that is, a change in
K does not affect the results. Under Assumption 2, the dealer will fulfill his payment
obligations t (θ) in all states of nature even if he has had no liquid funds at the outset,
i.e., K = 0, because otherwise his behavior is classified as fraud.
Now consider the second benchmark case where K is “very large” and p = 0.
Since the manufacturer knows for sure that the dealer is ignorant about θ , she assigns
the efficient quantity for the expected type, i.e., q p=0(s0) = qFB(E{θ}).
We next turn to our third benchmark case where 0 < p < 1, but, again, K is “very
large” such that constraint (5) is not binding. The solution to this special case of the
problem has been derived by Lewis and Sappington (1993, LS) before. LS show that
an ignorant dealer will get the same quantity assignment as an informed dealer who
knows that θ = E{θ}. This result extends to our problem and we will use it without
further proof. Technically spoken, the possibility that the dealer is ignorant introduces
a mass point into the distribution of θ and the solution has to trade off effects of this
mass point against effects occurring to the continuum of informed dealers. We denote
the resulting quantity assignment pattern as qLS(θ).
As LS do not incorporate a liquidity constraint, they implicitly assume that K is
always sufficient, or that it exceeds a lower bound KLS. KLS is given by
KLS = −2(s0 | θ) = −θ · qLS(E{θ}) − r(qLS(E{θ})) + tLS(E{θ})
= [E{θ} − θ ]qLS(E{θ}) −
E{θ}∫
θ
qLS(ϑ)dϑ. (11)
If K > KLS, the limited-liquidity constraint (5) is slack.
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Fig. 2 The First-Best (FB), the p = 1, and the Lewis–Sappington (LS) benchmark solutions
The following Lemma 2 formally states and Fig. 2 above illustrates the solution
that rests on the following reasoning. We start from a naïve combination of the above
benchmark results for p = 1 and p = 0, but now assume that p ∈ (0, 1). Obviously,
such a naïve combination, q(E{θ}) = qFB(E{θ}) and q(θ = E({θ}) = q p=1(θ),
would lead to false reporting. To prevent a dealer with some information θ ′ > E{θ}
from claiming to be ignorant, the manufacturer must make sure that q(θ ′) ≥ q(E{θ}).
Since there exists a nonempty interval ′ with q p=1(θ ∈ ′) < qFB(E{θ}), the
manufacturer must raise q(θ ∈ ′) above the benchmark level for the p = 1 case.
Simultaneously, the resulting inefficiency will be mitigated if the manufacturer reduces
q(E{θ}) below its First-Best level, thus also reducing the length of the interval with
q p=1(θ ′) < q(E{θ}). Hence, there is bunching over an interval [E{θ}, θ2]. Moreover,
the manufacturer will care about misreporting incentives for an ignorant dealer who
might be tempted to claim that θ < E{θ}. The associated incentive cost is higher than
in the p = 1 benchmark case: it consists of the incentive cost for an informed dealer
plus an additional ignorance cost for an uninformed dealer. These incentive costs, in
sum, lead to a higher distortion for an informed dealer with θ < E{θ}. Therefore,
qLS(θ < E{θ}) is depressed below the level of the benchmark solution q p=1(θ).
Lemma 2 (Lewis and Sappington 1993, Proposition 1) Suppose that p ∈ (0, 1). Then,
there exist a critical level of liquid funds, KLS, and a boundary level of the demand
parameter, θ2 > E{θ}, such that for all K ≥ KLS, the optimal quantity assignment
qLS(θ) is given by
1. qLS(θ) = q p=1(θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ2, θ ],
2. qLS(θ) = qLS(E{θ}) ∈ (q p=1(E{θ}), qFB(θ)) ∀θ ∈ [E{θ}, θ2]
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3. qLS(θ) < q p=1(θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ, E{θ})
where, for this interval, qLS(θ) solves
θ + r ′(q(θ)) − C ′(q(θ)) − 1 − F(θ)f (θ) −
1 − p
p f (θ) = 0. (12)
Proof See Lewis and Sappington (1993).
3.2 Solution to the general problem
We now turn to the general case where the dealer’s liquidity K does not exceed KLS
and where 0 < p < 1. Using a result by LS, the manufacturer’s problem (2)–(8) is
considerably simplified because of the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 The manufacturer assigns the same quantity to an ignorant dealer and an
informed dealer who knows that the realization of θ happens to be exactly E{θ},
q0 = q(E{θ}), t0 = t (E{θ}).
Proof The proof is identical to the one in LS.
Lemma 3 tells that an ignorant dealer is treated identically to a dealer who knows
that his demand parameter is equal to θ = E{θ}. The implication of this result is that
the manufacturer can treat the problem as one where the probability distribution of
the demand parameter has a mass point at θ = E{θ}. 
unionsq
This result is helpful in reducing the number of constraints. First, constraint (4) is
satisfied along with condition (3), and constraints (7) and (8) become special cases of
condition (6). In addition, using an element in the proof of Lemma 1, the participa-
tion constraint (3) is implied by the simpler condition 2(θ |θ) ≥ 0 and the incentive
compatibility constraint (6) may be replaced by the monotonicity constraint. These
observations enable us to restate the manufacturers maximization problem as follows.
max{
q(s), t (s)
s ∈ {s0} ∪ [θ, θ ]
} E{1(θ)} = p
θ∫
θ
[t (θ) − C(q(θ))] f (θ)dθ + (1 − p) [t0 − C(q0)]
(13)
subject to 2(θ |θ) ≥ 0, (14)
θq0 + r(q0) − t0 ≥ −K , (15)
q(θ) non-decreasing in θ. (16)
In what follows we denote the Lagrangian multiplier to constraint (14) by λ and to
constraint (15) by μ, λ,μ ≥ 0.
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Proposition 1 If 0 ≤ K ≤ KLS, both constraints, (14) and (15), are binding with
λ = 1 − μ. Moreover, λ = 0 if and only if K = 0 and μ = 0 if and only if K = KLS.
The result in Proposition 1 follows from the fact that a rise in K reduces μ because,
on the one hand, the limited liquidity constraint is relaxed. On the other hand, relaxing
the limited liquidity constraint in the manufacturer’s optimization problem increases
the relevance of the participation constraint that was only weakly binding in the
extreme case of K = 0. Thus, λ is increasing in K .
To save notation, let 1 be 1 if the statement  is true and 0 otherwise. The steps
along the proof also enable us to rewrite the manufacturer’s problem as to maximize7
p
θ∫
θ
[
θq(θ)+r(q(θ))−C(q(θ))−q(θ)
(
1−F(θ)
f (θ) −
(p − λ)1θ≤E{θ}
p f (θ)
)]
f (θ)dθ
+(1 − p)[θq0 + r(q0) − C(q0)] − (p − λ)[E{θ} − θ ]q0 + (1 − λ)K ,
with respect to q(θ) and q0, subject to q0 = q(E{θ}) and q(θ) non-decreasing in θ .
The new objective function reflects the different effects that enter the manufac-
turer’s optimization problem. First, the new objective function is a weighted average
of the benefits from contracting with the dealer in the state where demand information
has arrived timely and where the dealer is ignorant. Second, opportunity costs that
arise from the dealer’s limited liquidity enter the problem. Third, similar to the LS
problem, contracting with a dealer who knows that demand is low induces additional
ignorance costs (p − λ)1θ≤E{θ}/p f (θ).
For a first step towards the solution, we temporarily ignore the monotonicity require-
ment. Then, pointwise maximization delivers a set of preliminary ‘first-order condi-
tions’.
If θ > E{θ} θ + r ′(qu(θ)) − C ′(qu(θ)) − 1 − F(θ)f (θ) = 0 (17)
if θ < E{θ} θ + r ′(qu(θ)) − C ′(qu(θ)) −
(
1 − F(θ)
f (θ) −
p − λ
p
1
f (θ)
)
= 0 (18)
if θ = E{θ} (1− p) [θ+r ′(qu(E{θ}))−C ′(qu(E{θ}))]−(p−λ)[E{θ} − θ ] = 0
(19)
Here, qu(θ) denotes the solution to these three equations where the monotonicity
requirement is ignored. To shorten notation, define q ≡ lim→0[qu(θ − )] and
q ≡ lim→0[qu(θ + )] (where  > 0). The solution to the relaxed maximization
program violates the monotonicity requirement in many cases.
In order to illustrate the impact of limited liquidity and the violation of the mono-
tonicity constraint as clearly as possible, consider the case of K = 0 and hence λ = 0.
7 Compare Lemma 5 in the Appendix.
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Fig. 3 Countervailing incentives in the case of K = 0
Condition (17) reveals that the upward sided limit gives the usual p = 1 benchmark-
case rule
lim
→0[E{θ} +  + r
′(qu(E{θ} + )) − C ′(qu(E{θ} + ))] = 1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) > 0
(20)
whereas, from condition (18), the left-hand sided limit is
lim
→0[E{θ} −  + r
′(qu(E{θ} − )) − C ′(qu(E{θ} − ))] = − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) < 0.
(21)
It follows that q > q . The situation is graphed in Fig. 3. The manufacturer has an
incentive to assign a quantity below the First-Best level to an informed dealer with
favorable information and to assign a quantity above the First-Best level to an informed
dealer with unfavorable information.
To gather the intuition for this, note first that in the absence of a potentially ignorant
dealer, the incentive constraints are (locally) binding downwards, i.e., a dealer with
favorable information must be compensated for not pretending to have unfavorable
information. Now, take the possibility of an ignorant dealer into account. Because
of the protection by limited liquidity, the latter will earn an expected profit equal
to
[
E{θ} − θ] q0. Imagine that, in this situation, the manufacturer proposes a con-
tract that resembles the solution to the p = 1 benchmark case. Then, a dealer with
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information s = E{θ}−ε (ε > 0 “small”) could gather an enormous increase in profit
by slightly overstating the demand parameter. Therefore, contrary to the p = 1 bench-
mark case, incentive constraints are upward binding for some θ < E{θ}. It follows that
the manufacturer will want to increase the quantity q(θ) to a higher level than qFB(θ)
rather than decrease it. Naturally, this effect is absent for a dealer who has more favor-
able information than E{θ}. For the latter types of the dealer, the manufacturer prefers
the usual under-trade assignment. Hence, for K = 0, the quantity assignment for the
relaxed problem jumps downward at E{θ}. This is known as countervailing-incentive
effect (see Lewis and Sappington 1989; Jullien 2000).
Returning to the general case, λ ≥ 0 or K ≥ 0, the preliminary quantity assignment
may either jump upward or downward at E{θ}, depending on the relative size of λ and
p. The above sketch shows that for a given p, there is a downward jump (q > q) if K
is small. On the other hand, the LS benchmark result in Lemma 2 tells us that there is
an upward jump (q < q) if K is sufficiently large.
The presence of a potentially ignorant dealer raises a second monotonicity problem
of the quantity assignment, though. While the above countervailing-incentive effect
just affects the informed types of dealers around E{θ}, it remains to clarify how the
manufacturer wishes to set the quantity assignment for an ignorant dealer. It is obvi-
ous that the manufacturer’s benefit from dealing with an ignorant dealer is different
from the benefit of dealing with an informed dealer. On the one hand, distorting the
quantity scheme at E{θ} is costly to the manufacturer because the total surplus is
diminished. On the other hand, by raising the quantity towards the First-Best level, the
manufacturer must leave higher expected rents to informed types of the dealer with
θ > E{θ}.
If the monotonicity constraint is violated, we need to “smooth” the quantity assign-
ment scheme and bunching will occur for some subinterval [θ1, θ2] ⊂ [θ, θ ]. Departing
from the preliminary “solution”, qu(θ), we also have to optimize over the bunching
region. As the potential jump of the preliminary solution qu(θ) occurs at E{θ}, this
point will clearly be an element of the bunching region. To solve for the optimal
bunching region and, hence, q0, define the maximum value function
W ∗(q0) = E
{
1 + 2 − qu(θ)1 − F(θ) − p + λf (θ) | θ < θ1
}
+E
{
1 + 2 − q0 1 − F(θ) − p + λf (θ) | θ1 ≤ θ < E{θ}
}
+E
{
1 + 2 − q0 1 − F(θ)f (θ) | E{θ} ≤ θ < θ2
}
+E
{
1 + 2 − qu(θ)1 − F(θ)f (θ) | θ ≥ θ2
}
.
The optimal bunching quantity assignment q0 is given as the solution to
max
q0
p · W ∗(q0) + (1 − p) · [θq0 + r(q0) − C(q0)]
−(p − λ) · [E{θ} − θ ] · q0 + (1 − λ) · K
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The corresponding first-order condition reads8
(1 − p)θ + [1 − p + p (F(θ2) − F(θ1))] [r ′(q0) − C ′(q0)]
− p · [θ2(1 − F(θ2)) − θ1(1 − F(θ1))] − (p − λ)(θ1 − θ) = 0. (22)
Now consider how the solution to (22), q0, reacts to an increase of liquidity K .
In this case, the ignorant dealer is less protected and will earn lower profits. The
consequences are twofold. First, the quantity that the manufacturer wishes to assign
to the ignorant dealer will be moved towards a more efficient level. Technically, the
preliminary quantity qu(E{θ}) rises. Second, a rise in K directly affects the behavior
of an informed dealer who knows that θ < E{θ}. As the rent for the ignorant type is
reduced, there are less incentives to overstate the own type. This enables the manu-
facturer to reduce the preliminary over-trade assignment. As a result, the preliminary
quantity assignment qu(θ < E{θ}) is reduced. This again reduces the length of the
bunching area below θ = E{θ}.
Finally, note that for K → KLS, the protection of the ignorant dealer by the lim-
ited-liability constraint vanishes, μ = 0 (and λ = 1). If, in this case, there was no
interaction with the informed types, the manufacturer would be willing to set q0 equal
to the First-Best level. However, because there is interaction, the manufacturer would
have to leave high information rents to an informed dealer with θ > E{θ} if q0 was
set equal to qFB(E{θ}). Hence, q0 is set below the efficient level and the quantity
assignments to types below E{θ} are set even below q p=1(θ).
Given the above effects, the final question is about the relative speeds with which
the downward and upward movements of q and qu(E{θ}) occur, once K rises. Gener-
ally, it is very unlikely that q and qu(E{θ}) cross each other at some value such that,
by coincidence, they simultaneously match the upper limit quantity q . In this very
special case, no bunching occurs and the quantity assignment schedule qu(θ) from
the relaxed problem is part of the optimal solution.
To prepare the analysis of the resulting movements of q and qu(E{θ}) when K
rises, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 1 The inverse hazard rate (1 − F(·))/ f (·) is called
Jensen convex if and only if E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
≥ 1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) , (23)
Jensen concave if and only if E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
≤ 1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) , (24)
and Jensen linear if and only if it is Jensen concave and Jensen convex. As usual, we
speak of strict Jensen convexity/concavity if and only if strict inequalities apply.
8 See the proof to Lemma 6 in the Appendix.
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Remark Note that the case of Jensen convexity covers all symmetric and single-peaked
density functions.9 Moreover, a uniform distribution has a Jensen linear inverse hazard
rate.
In order to describe the quantity assignment, we also use the following definition.
Definition 2 If the optimal bunching quantity q0 is such that θ1 < E{θ} and θ2 =
E{θ}, we call the bunching regime downward sided.
If q0 induces θ1 < E{θ} and θ2 > E{θ}, we call the bunching regime double
sided.
If q0 is such that θ1 = E{θ} and θ2 > E{θ}, we call the bunching regime upward
sided.
Given these definitions, consider the case of Jensen linearity closer. For this spe-
cial case, there exists some intermediate K such that the same quantity assignment
emerges as in the p = 1 benchmark case. We state this as our first central result.
Theorem 1 Let the inverse hazard rate be Jensen linear. For any given value of p,
there exists Kˆ such that μ(Kˆ ) = (1 − p) and λ(Kˆ ) = p. We obtain downward sided
bunching for all K < Kˆ while there is upward sided bunching for all K > Kˆ . For
K = Kˆ , the optimal quantity assignment equals q p=1(θ).
The nice properties of the case with Jensen linearity can be easily seen from inspec-
tion of the ‘preliminary first-order conditions’ (17), (18), and (19). If λ(K ) = p, it is
straightforward to see that q = q . To see that condition (19) completes the continuous
quantity assignment rule, rewrite the equation as
θ + r ′(q0) − C ′(q0) = E{θ} + r ′(q0) − C ′(q0) − E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
= 0 (25)
which, under Jensen linearity, is equivalent to
E{θ} + r ′(q0) − C ′(q0) − 1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) = 0. (26)
Suppose that p drops below λ(K ). Now, the manufacturer must decide where to
put the bunching region. If the probability that the manufacturer faces an informed
dealer is low, the necessary rent that induces truth-telling by an informed dealer with
θ > E{θ} becomes relatively large. To limit this rent, the quantity assignment for an
informed dealer with θ < E{θ} is depressed even below the p = 1 assignment and
there is bunching for types above E{θ}. On the other hand, suppose that p > λ(K ).
Then, the probability of facing an informed dealer is large, but limited liquidity is a
relatively serious issue. As a consequence, the manufacturer has an incentive to reduce
9 If f (·) is symmetric we have f (E{θ} − a) = f (E{θ} + a) which implies 1 − F(E{θ}) = 12 and
E{θ} = θ+θ2 . Thus, E
{
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
}
= E{θ} − θ = θ−θ2 . Finally, the single peak yields f (E{θ}) > 1θ−θ
which implies 1−F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) = 12 f (E{θ}) <
θ−θ
2 = E
{
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
}
.
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the quantity assignment of an ignorant dealer. It follows that we observe downward
sided bunching.
Next, suppose that the inverse hazard function is strictly Jensen convex. Consider a
dealer whose liquidity is such that λ(K ) = p. Condition (25) shows that q0 < q = q
since the first order derivative of the manufacturer’s objective function is negative at
q = q = q . Hence, there will be downward sided bunching. This situation arises
because the upward movement of qu(E{θ}) in K is slower than the corresponding
downward movement of q . Hence, there exist some K where the left- and upward
sided limits of the preliminary schedule qu are in no contradiction to the monoto-
nicity constraint (q < q), but the ‘slow’ upward movement of qu(E{θ}) still makes
bunching necessary (qu(E{θ}) < q). If liquidity increases, there exists some interval
(K1, K2) such that the optimal quantity for the ignorant type just falls between q and
q . In these cases, the preliminary quantity assignment rule qu(θ) does not violate the
monotonicity constraint and there is no bunching. For even higher K , qu(E{θ}) will
exceed q and there will be upward sided bunching. This is summarized as follows.
Theorem 2 Let the inverse hazard rate be strictly Jensen convex. For any given value
of p, there exist K1 and K2 with K1 < K2 such that there is downward sided bunching
for all K < K1, there is no bunching for all K ∈ [K1, K2], and there is upward sided
bunching for all K > K2.
For strictly Jensen concave inverse hazard rates, the relative movements of
qu(E{θ}), q, and q are just opposite. The upward movement of qu(E{θ}) in K will
be faster than the corresponding downward movement of q . Hence, there will exist a
range (K , K ) where it still holds that q > q , and the preliminary quantity assignment
for the ignorant type falls between q and q. It follows that bunching cannot be avoided.
This is summarized as our final result.
Theorem 3 Let the inverse hazard rate be strictly Jensen concave. There exist K and
K such that there is downward sided bunching for all K < K , double-sided bunching
for all K ∈ [K ; K ] and upward sided bunching for all K > K .
4 Conclusion
We have investigated supplier-credit contracting where a manufacturer does not know
whether a dealer with limited liquid funds has gathered timely demand information
at the contracting stage. We have found that there will be bunching in almost any
case. If the probability of facing an ignorant dealer is high and the latter’s liquidity is
low, bunching occurs if the dealer is informed but has unfavorable information. In the
contrary case where the dealer’s liquidity is high relative to the likelihood that he is
ignorant, bunching is only an issue for some types that are better than the average. For
the intermediate cases, it depends on the curvature of the inverse hazard rate whether
there is bunching for some intermediate types or no bunching at all.
Our results raise follow-up questions. In our model, the dealer is either informed or
ignorant about demand of the upcoming period. Alternatively, one may assume that
the dealer always has demand information, but this information is noisy. While this
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amendment will have little impact on the solution if liquidity is high, we should expect
bunching to become an even more serious issue if liquidity is low. In the extreme, if
the variance of the noise variable is very high and the dealer’s liquidity is zero, no
screening will occur. Moreover, one could extend the timing of our game and allow
for several order dates. Now, the order strategies of an informed and an ignorant dealer
should look different such that an additional screening device exists which may help
to overcome the problems arising from being ignorant jointly with the limited liquidity
restriction.
From the perspective of contract enforcement, verifiability of important variables
is crucial. For instance, we have assumed that the manufacturer may always observe
and verify the quantity that has been sold by the dealer. This may be possible, if the
manufacturer has installed a guarantee system for his products (as is, for instance,
common in the car manufacturing industry). Another setting could be that the manu-
facturer cannot observe the quantity that has been sold by the dealer. Then, a dealer
who has reported to be ignorant about demand might claim that the assigned quantity
could not be sold. In the extreme case without liquid funds at the outset, the opti-
mal supply-credit contract would exclude such a dealer and—as a consequence—any
informed dealer with unfavorable information.
From an empirical perspective, our research suggests that trade credits should come
along with restrictions on the quantity assignment and with non-linear pricing sched-
ules. We expect to see a non-linear pricing scheme with discontinuities and strong
dependence of the terms of the supply-credit contract on the dealer’s initial financial
position.
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Appendix
Preliminary steps. Before we formally prove the results, we restate preliminary
results that are used in all the subsequent maximization problems. Consider two values
θ > θ ′. If the incentive constraint (6) holds, we may write
θq(θ)+r(q(θ))−t (θ)≥θq(θ ′)+r(q(θ ′))−t (θ ′) or 2(θ |θ)−2(θ
′|θ ′)
θ−θ ′ ≥q(θ
′)
θ ′q(θ ′)+r(q(θ ′))−t (θ ′)≥θ ′q(θ)+r(q(θ))−t (θ) or 2(θ |θ)−2(θ
′|θ ′)
θ−θ ′ ≤q(θ).
Taking the limit, it follows that truth-telling implies ˙(θ |θ) = q(θ). Hence, we may
write
2(θ |θ) = 2(θ |θ) +
θ∫
θ
q(ϑ)dϑ. (27)
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Since 2(θ | θ) > 0 for all θ > θ , we thus may replace the participation constraint
(3) by
2(θ | θ) ≥ 0. (28)
Moreover, as shown by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) or in Theorem 7.3 in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991), if q(θ) is non-decreasing in θ , the incentive constraint (6) is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 1 If p = 1, the constraints (4), (7), and (8) are not binding. It follows
that the modified participation constraint (28) must be binding in the manufacturer’s
optimum because otherwise the manufacturer could raise t (m) for each m by a positive
amount and increase her profit.
Using these results, rewrite the manufacturer’s objective function (2) as
θ∫
θ
⎡
⎢⎣θq(θ) + r(q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) −
θ∫
θ
q(ϑ)dϑ
⎤
⎥⎦ f (θ)dθ.
Integration by parts leads to the manufacturer’s objective function (9) in Lemma 1.
Pointwise maximization leads to the implicit rule for q p=1(θ) as stated in condition
(10). Finally, notice that Assumption 1 implies that q p=1(θ) is nondecreasing in θ .

unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 We proceed along the following steps. In Lemma 4, we show
that at least one of the constraints (14) and (15) is binding in the manufacturer’s opti-
mum. We also show that in the case of positive but sufficiently low liquidity (i.e.,
0 < K < KLS), the fact that the participation constraint (14) is binding (i.e. λ > 0)
implies that also the limited liquidity constraint (15) is binding (i.e., μ > 0). The final
step is to show that the reverse implication also holds (Lemma 6).
Lemma 4 In the manufacturer’s optimum, at least one of the constraints (14) and
(15) is binding. Moreover, if K < KLS, the fact that constraint (14) is binding implies
that constraint (15) is binding.
Proof of Lemma 4 Use (27) to rewrite the limited liability constraint (15) as
θq0 + r(q0) − t0 + K = (θ |θ) +
θ∫
θ
q(ϑ)dϑ − [E{θ} − θ ]q0 + K ≥ 0.
As any increase in (θ |θ) is costly to the manufacturer, at least one of the constraints
(14) and (15) will be binding in the manufacturer’s optimum.
Now assume that (θ |θ) = 0, i.e., λ > 0. If constraint (15) is slack, we are back
to the LS case. Then it must necessarily hold that K exceeds a lower bound KLS,
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given by
KLS = −2(s0 | θ) = −θ · qLS(E{θ}) − r(qLS(θ)) + tLS(E{θ})
= [E{θ} − θ ]qLS(E{θ}) −
E{θ}∫
θ
qLS(ϑ)dϑ.
Hence, assume that K < KLS. If (θ |θ) = 0 holds, it follows that the limited liquidity
constraint (15) is binding too. 
unionsq
To continue the analysis we now consider the reverse direction, i.e., we assume
that the limited liquidity constraint (15) is binding. We directly substitute the binding
constraint into the objective function, thus omitting μ for the ease of presentation.
Integrating by parts, we simplify the statement of the manufacturer’s problem as fol-
lows.
Lemma 5 Suppose that 0 < K < KLS and constraint (15) is binding. Let 1 be 1
if the statement  is true and 0 otherwise. Then, the manufacturer’s maximization
problem can be restated as
max
q(θ),q0
p
θ∫
θ
[
θq(θ) + r(q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) − q(θ)
(
1 − F(θ)
f (θ) −
(p − λ)1θ≤E{θ}
p f (θ)
)]
× f (θ)dθ + (1 − p)[θq0 + r(q0) − C(q0)] − (p − λ)[E{θ} − θ]q0 + (1 − λ)K ,
(29)
subject to q0 = q(E{θ}) and q(θ) non-decreasing in θ .
Proof of Lemma 5 The manufacturer’s Lagrangian is given as
p
θ∫
θ
[t (θ) − C(q(θ))] f (θ)dθ + (1 − p) [t (E{θ}) − C(q(E{θ}))] + λ2(θ |θ)
where t (θ) = θq(θ)+r(q(θ))−(θ |θ)−∫ θ
θ
q(ϑ)dϑ . We use the fact that constraint
(15) is binding by eliminating 2(θ |θ) as follows
2(θ |θ) = 2(E{θ}|E{θ}) −
E{θ}∫
θ
q(ϑ)dϑ − t (E{θ})
= [E{θ} − θ ]q0 −
E{θ}∫
θ
q(ϑ)dϑ − K .
Substituting into the Lagrangian proves the Lemma. 
unionsq
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The following Lemma states that the Lagrange multiplier λ is strictly positive, if
K > 0 and the limited liquidity constraint (15) is binding. Since we have previously
shown that for 0 < K < KLS a binding participation constraint (14) implies a binding
limited liquidity constraint (15), we are now able to state that these two properties are
equivalent.
Lemma 6 Suppose that 0 < K < KLS and constraint (15) is binding. The optimal
bunching quantity assignment q0 is given as the solution to
(1 − p)θ + [1 − p + p (F(θ2) − F(θ1))] [r ′(q0) − C ′(q0)]
− p · [θ2(1 − F(θ2)) − θ1(1 − F(θ1))] − (p − λ)(θ1 − θ) = 0. (30)
Moreover, for 0 < K < KLS both Lagrange multipliers are between zero and one
with μ = 1 − λ. For K = 0 we obtain λ = 0 and for K = KLS we have μ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 6 Ignore the monotonicity constraint and take the pointwise deriv-
ative of the objective function (29). Denote the solution to the relaxed problem by
qu(θ). It is determined as follows.
If θ > E{θ} θ + r ′(qu(θ)) − C ′(qu(θ)) − 1 − F(θ)f (θ) = 0
if θ < E{θ} θ + r ′(qu(θ)) − C ′(qu(θ)) −
(
1 − F(θ)
f (θ) −
p − λ
p
1
f (θ)
)
= 0
if θ = E{θ} (1− p) [θ+r ′(qu(E{θ})) − C ′(qu(E{θ}))] − (p − λ)[E{θ} − θ] = 0.
We now prove that condition (30) determines the optimal pooling quantity. Monoto-
nicity requires q ≤ qu(E{θ}) ≤ q . If this condition is violated under the preliminary
first-order conditions, we have to find an optimal bunching quantity q0. We use a
two-step procedure.
Step 1: Let q0 be given. The maximum value function W ∗(q0) is given by
W ∗(q0) =
θ1∫
θ
[
θqu(θ) + r(qu(θ)) − C(qu(θ)) − qu(θ)
(
1 − F(θ)
f (θ) −
p − λ
p
1
f (θ)
)]
f (θ)dθ
+
E{θ}∫
θ1
[
θq0 + r(q0) − C(q0) − q0
(
1 − F(θ)
f (θ) −
p − λ
p
1
f (θ)
)]
f (θ)dθ
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+
θ2∫
E{θ}
[
θq0 + r(q0) − C(q0) − q0 1 − F(θ)f (θ)
]
f (θ)dθ
+
θ∫
θ2
[
θqu(θ) + r(qu(θ)) − C(qu(θ)) − qu(θ)1 − F(θ)f (θ)
]
f (θ)dθ.
(31)
Step 2: Now, solve for the optimal q0. To this end, maximize
P ≡ p · W ∗(q0) − (p − λ) · [E{θ} − θ] · q0
+(1 − p) · [θq0 + r(q0) − C(q0)] + (1 − λ) · K (32)
with respect to q0. As a necessary maximization condition we obtain
p · W ∗′(q0) − (p − λ) · [E{θ} − θ ] + (1 − p) · [θ + r ′(q0) − C ′(q0)] = 0 (33)
where
W ∗′(q0) = p − λ
p
· [E{θ} − θ1] − θ2(1 − F(θ2)) + θ1(1 − F(θ1))
+[r ′(q0) − C ′(q0)] [F(θ2) − F(θ1)] . (34)
Substitute (34) into (33) and rearrange to obtain
(1 − p)θ + [1 − p + p (F(θ2) − F(θ1))] [r ′(q0) − C ′(q0)·]
− p · [θ2(1 − F(θ2)) − θ1(1 − F(θ1))] − (p − λ)(θ1 − θ) = 0. (35)
Now, we prove the comparative statics about λ. To this end, apply the implicit-func-
tion theorem to
G1(λ; q0) = (1 − p)θ + [r ′(q0) − C ′(q0)] · [1 − p + p (F(θ2) − F(θ1))]
− p · [θ2(1 − F(θ2)) − θ1(1 − F(θ1))] − (p − λ)(θ1 − θ) = 0,
(36)
G2(λ; q0) = [E(θ) − θ ] · q0 − K −
E(θ)∫
θ
q(θ˜)d θ˜ = 0, (37)
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to get
dλ
d K
= −
∣∣∣∣∣
G1K G
1
q0
G2K G
2
q0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
G1λ G
1
q0
G2λ G
2
q0
∣∣∣∣∣
=
− ∂2 P
∂(q0)2
(θ1 − θ)(E{θ} − θ) > 0, (38)
(where P is defined in (32)), and
dq0
dK
= 1
(E{θ} − θ) > 0. (39)
Compare q and q as given by the respective limits of (17) and (18). To see that
λ(0) = 0 observe that for K = 0 it must hold that θq0+r(q0)−t0 ≥ 0 which, using the
incentive constraint for an informed dealer, implies that θq(θ) + r(q(θ)) − t (θ) ≥ 0.
To see that μ = 1 − λ rewrite problem (13)–(16) using (θ |θ) = 0 while adding
the liability constraint with its Lagrangian multiplier, μ. The usual manipulations lead
to the objective function
max
q(θ),q0
p
θ∫
θ
[
θq(θ) + r(q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) − q(θ)1 − F(θ)f (θ)
+ (p − 1 + μ)1θ≤E{θ}
p f (θ) q(θ)
]
f (θ)dθ
+(1 − p)[E{θ}q0 + r(q0) − C(q0)] − μ[E{θ} − θ ]q0 + μK .
Comparing the problem formulation to that in Lemma 5, we immediately see that
μ = 1 − λ. 
unionsq
Proofs of Theorems 1 to 3
Definition 3 To shorten notation we define
α ≡
1−F(E{θ})
f (E{θ}
E
{
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
} . (40)
Using this definition, we have α = 1 if and only if the hazard rate is Jensen linear,
α < 1 if and only if the hazard rate is Jensen convex, and α > 1 if and only if the
hazard rate is Jensen concave.
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Lemma 7 Define
λˆ = 1 − (1 − p)α and (41)
λˇ = 1 − F(E{θ}) + (1 − p)αF(E{θ})
1 − F(E{θ}) + 1−pp α
. (42)
We get qu(E{θ}) < q (= q,> q) if and only if λ < λˆ (λ = λˆ, λ > λˆ) and qu(E{θ}) <
q (= q,> q) if and only if λ < λˇ (λ = λˇ, λ > λˇ).
Proof of Lemma 7 First, evaluate (19) at q0 = q .
(1 − p) [θ + r ′(q) − C ′(q)] − (p − λ)[E{θ} − θ ]
= (1 − p)
[
1 − F(E{θ})
f (E{θ}) − E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}]
− (p − λ)E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
= (1 − p)1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) − (1 − λ)E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
where this expression is negative (positive, equal to zero) if and only if λ < λˆ (λ >
λˆ, λ = λˆ).
Now, evaluate (19) at q0 = q .
(1 − p) [θ + r ′(q) − C ′(q] − (p − λ)[E{θ} − θ ]
= (1 − p)1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) −
(1 − p)(p − λ)
p f (E{θ}) − (1 − λ)E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
where this expression is negative (positive, equal to zero) if and only if λ < λˇ (λ >
λˇ, λ = λˇ). 
unionsq
Lemma 8 Comparing the two threshold values λˆ and λˇ and p, we get
α < 1 p < λˇ < λˆ
α = 1 p = λˇ = λˆ
α > 1 p > λˇ > λˆ
Proof of Lemma 8 By direct comparison of (41) and (42). 
unionsq
Lemma 9 Suppose qu(E{θ}) < q < q holds. Then, q0 < q if λ ≤ p and α ≤ 1.
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Proof of Lemma 9 Evaluate the first-order condition (22) at q which implies θ2 =
E{θ} and θ1 ∈ [θ; E{θ}], such that
(1 − p) [θ + r ′(q) − C ′(q)] + p[r ′(q) − C ′(q)] (F(E{θ}) − F(θ1))
−pE(1 − F(E{θ})) + pθ1(1 − F(θ1)) − (p − λ)[θ1 − θ ]
= (1 − p)
(
1 − F(E{θ})
f (E{θ}) − E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
})
− (p − λ)[θ1 − θ ]
+pF(E{θ}) (E{θ} + r ′(q) − C ′(q)] − pE{θ}
−pF(θ1)
(
θ1 + r ′(q) − C ′(q)
] + pθ1. (43)
Since
∂[pF(θ)(θ+r ′(q) − C ′(q))− pθ ]
∂θ
= p f (θ)
[
θ + r ′(q) − C ′(q)) − 1 − F(θ)f (θ)
]
=0
if q = qu(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ; E{θ}], and the respective second order derivative is
positive, we have
pF(E{θ}) (E{θ} + r ′(q) − C ′(q)] − pE{θ} < pF(θ1) (θ1 + r ′(q) − C ′(q)] − pθ1
such that (43) is negative if λ ≤ p and α ≤ 1. 
unionsq
Lemma 10 Suppose qu(E{θ}) > q > q holds. We get q0 < q if λ < λˆ while we get
q0 > q if λ > λˆ.
Proof of Lemma 10 Evaluate the first-order condition (22) at q0 = q which implies
θ1 = θ2 = E{θ} and therefore
(1 − p) (θ + r ′(q) − C ′(q)) − (p − λ)[E{θ} − θ ]
= (1 − p)1 − F(E{θ})f (E{θ}) − (1 − λ)E
{
1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
}
. (44)
Expression (44) is positive for all λ > λˆ such that q0 > q , negative for all λ < λˆ such
that q0 < q , and equal to zero if λ = λˆ which implies q0 = q . 
unionsq
Corollary 1 Suppose qu(E{θ}) < q ≤ q holds. We get q0 < q if λ < λˆ.
Proof of Corollary 1 Evaluate the first-order condition (22) at q which implies θ2 =
E{θ} and θ1 ∈ [θ; E{θ}]. Parallel reasoning as in Lemma 10 reveals that this expres-
sion is negative if λ < λˆ. 
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1 As α = 1, we get λˆ = p = λˇ. Depending on λ, three possible
subcases can emerge.
– Case a: Let λ be small such that λ < λˆ = p = λˇ. This inequality immediately
reveals that qu(E{θ}) < q < q . Lemma 9 shows that q0 < q . Thus, there is
downward sided bunching.
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– Case b: Suppose λ = λˆ = p = λˇ, which implies q = q = qu(E{θ}). The
preliminary first-order conditions do not violate the monotonicity requirement.
They define the solution, and there is no bunching.
– Case c: Let λ be large such that λˆ = p = λˇ < λ, which means q < q < qu(E{θ}).
Lemma 10 shows that q0 > q as λ > λˆ, such that there is upward sided bunching.

unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 As α < 1, we get p < λˇ < λˆ. Depending on λ, four possible
subcases can emerge.
– Case a: Let λ be small such that λ ≤ p < λˇ < λˆ which implies qu(E{θ}) < q ≤ q
where the equality holds if and only if λ = p. Following Lemma 9 we get q0 < q
or there will be downward sided bunching.
– Case b: Let p < λ < λˇ < λˆ which means qu(E{θ}) < q < q . Following Corollary
1, q0 < q holds. Thus, there is downward sided bunching too.
– Case c: Let p < λˇ ≤ λ ≤ λˆ which implies q ≤ qu(E{θ}) ≤ q . The monotonicity
constraint is not violated and there is no bunching.
– Case d: Let p < λˇ < λˆ < λ. Since q < q < qu(E{θ}), Lemma 10 applies and
q0 > q implies upward sided bunching. 
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 From α > 1 we get λˆ < λˇ < p. Three different subcases have to
be considered.
– Case a: Consider λˆ < λˇ < p < (=)λ which means q < (=)q < qu(E{θ}). Apply
Lemma 10 to get q0 > q or upward sided bunching.
– Case b: Consider small values of λ < λˆ < λˇ < p. First note that if α > 1/(1− p),
our interval gets empty as λˆ = 0. Therefore suppose α < 1/(1− p). Condition (43)
does not give clear cut evidence. At least for some neighborhood around α = 1 the
same arguments as under Theorem 1 apply. If α increases, the sign may change
such that double sided bunching occurs. Thus, we can define K and λ(K ) < λˆ such
that the first-order condition evaluated at q (condition (43)) is just equal to zero.
For all λ < λ(K ) there is downward-sided bunching while there is double-sided
bunching for λ ∈ [λ(K ); Kˆ ]
– Case c: Consider intermediate values of λ. There exist K with λ(K ) ∈ [λˆ; p];
K < K , such that q0 < q for all K < K and q0 > q for all K > K . Thus, there
is double-sided bunching for all K ∈ [K ; K ], there. is downward sided bunching
for all K < K , and there is upward sided bunching for all K > K . 
unionsq
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